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Bridge: Bridge: Professional Responsibility

Professional Responsibility and the First
Amendment: Are Missouri Attorneys Free
to Express Their Views?
Matter of Westfall'
I. INTRODUCTION
The history of First Amendment cases in our country demonstrates that
many attorneys have argued successfully for the free speech rights of their
clients. When an attorney seeks to invoke the same right as a defense in a
professional disciplinary action, however, the attorney may find less shelter
under the First Amendment. This Note examines the extent of first amendment protection a Missouri attorney receives when criticizing courts or judges.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
The Advisory Committee of the Missouri Bar instituted a disciplinary
proceeding against George R. (Buzz) Westfall, charging him with violations
of Rules 8.2(a), 8.4(a), and 8.4(d) of Missouri Supreme Court Rule 4, Rules
of Professional Conduct.2 The Missouri Supreme Court limited its review to
the finding that Westfall violated Rule 8.2(a), which prohibits an attorney
from making false or reckless statements about the qualifications or integrity
of a judge

1. 808 S.W.2d 829 (Mo. 1991) (en banc).

2. Mo. S. Cr. R. 4, RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr.
Rule 8.2(a) states:
A lawyer shall not make a statement that the lawyer knows to be false or
with reckless disregard as to its truth or falsity concerning the qualifications
or integrity of a judge, adjudicatory officer or public legal officer, or of a
candidate for election or appointment to judicial or legal office.
Rule 8.4 states in part:
It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:
(a) violate or attempt to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct,
knowingly assist or induce another to do so, or do so through the acts of
another;
(d) engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice;

3. Westfall, 808 S.W.2d at 832. The court stated that the charges brought under
Rule 8.4 were encompassed within the violation of Rule 8.2(a) and could not be
distinguished for the imposition of discipline. Id. at 839.
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Westfall was the prosecuting attorney of St. Louis County when he made
the statements that led to the disciplinary action.4 As prosecutor, Westfall had
participated in the proceedings against Dennis Bulloch for crimes connected
with the death of Bulloch's wife.5 When the Missouri Eastern District Court
of Appeals granted Bulloch a temporary writ of prohibition to prevent further
prosecution for armed criminal action, Westfall made remarks to a St. Louis
television station criticizing the court's opinion and the author, Judge Kent
Karohl.6
Westfall said that "for reasons that I find somewhat illogical, and I think
even a little bit less than honest, Judge Karohl has said today that we cannot
pursue armed criminal action. He has really distorted the statute and I think
convoluted logic to arrive at a decision that he personally likes. 7 He also
stated that Judge Karohl "made up his mind before he wrote the decision" and
"just reached the conclusion that he wanted to reach." s

4. Id. at 831.
5. Id. Bulloch was found not guilty of first or second degree murder and guilty
of involuntary manslaughter. See State ex rel. Bulloch v. Seier, 771 S.W.2d 71, 72
(Mo. 1989) (en banc), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 718 (1990). Subsequent to the homicide
trial, Bulloch was indicted on charges of armed criminal action and tampering with
physical evidence. Id. at 72. The Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, granted
a temporary writ of prohibition to bar further prosecution of Bulloch, holding that the
prosecution for armed criminal action constituted double jeopardy. The Missouri
Supreme Court made the writ absolute. See id. at 72-76.
6. Westfall, 808 S.W.2d at 831-32. The full content of his statements are
contained in the opinion:
The Supreme Court of the land has said twice that our armed criminal
statute is constitutional and that it does not constitute Double Jeopardy.
[B]ut for reasons that I find somewhat illogical, and I think even a little bit
less than honest, Judge Karohl has said today that we cannot pursue armed
criminal action. He has really distorted the statute and I think convoluted
logic to arrive at a decision that he personally likes.
The decision today will have a negative impact on all murder one cases
pending in Missouri, in the future in Missouri, and some that are already
on appeal with inmates in prison. So it's a real distressing opinion from
that point of view.
But if it's murder first degree and we're asking for death, which of course,
is the most serious of all crimes, Judge Karohl's decision today says we
cannot pursue both. And that, to me, really means that he made up his
mind before he wrote the decision, and just reached the conclusion that he
wanted to reach.
Id.
7. Id. at 831.
8. Id. at 832.
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The advisory committee charged Westfall with violations of the rules of
professional conduct and requested that Westfall be disbarred. 9 The Missouri
Supreme Court appointed Judge Bruce Normile of the Second Judicial Circuit
as master of the disciplinary proceedings, and he recommended that Westfall
be suspended from the practice of law for one year.1"
The Missouri Supreme Court reviewed the evidence of the proceedings
to determine if Westfall violated Rule 8.2(a)." The majority applied an
objective standard and found that Westfall made the statements about the
appellate decision and Judge Karohl with reckless disregard as to their truth
or falsity.' 2 The court held that Westfall's conduct was prejudicial to the
administration of justice and was in violation of the rule. 3 The court noted
that this was a case of first impression and initial construction of Rule 8.2(a);
therefore, Westfall only received a public reprimand.' 4
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The First Amendment protects the "profound national commitment" to
debate on public issues, even when such debate involves criticism of the
government or public officials.' 5 Despite this commitment to "uninhibited,
robust" debate,16 courts have often declined to give attorneys full First
Amendment protection when they have criticized the judiciary. 7
Criticism of the judiciary is only one of the areas where attorneys have
limited First Amendment freedom. Attorneys are subject to speech restrictions
when they advertise,' s solicit business, 19 or comment on a pending trial.20
The history of these restrictions reveals the ongoing tension between an

9. Id. at 831.
10. Id.
11. Id. The findings and recommendations of the master are advisory. The court
reviews the evidence de novo and draws its own conclusions of law. Id.
12. Id. at 837-38.
13. Id. at 838.
14. Id. at 839.
15. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
16. Id. at 270.
17. See In re Raggio, 487 P.2d 499, 500 (Nev. 1971); see also In re Troy, 111
A. 723 (R.I. 1920). But cf. Ramsey v. Board of Professional Responsibility, 771
S.W.2d 116, 121-22 (Tenn. 1989) (a lawyer has every right to criticize court
proceedings and judges as long as the statements are made in good faith, without the
intent to willfully misrepresent judges or courts), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 917 (1989).
18. See infra notes 85-115 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 50-84 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 21-49 and accompanying text.
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attorney's First Amendment rights and the state's interest in regulating the
profession.
A. Trial Publicity
In Sheppard v. Maxwell,"1 the United States Supreme Court observed
that an attorney who is allowed to speak to the press without restriction may
adversely affect the fairness of a trial. Dr. Sam Sheppard, accused of
murdering his wife, was the subject of extensive press coverage and publicity
prior to his trial.' During the trial, the judge did little to control the jurors'
exposure to the media barrage. 23 The press' attendance and coverage of the
trial created a "carnival atmosphere" in the courtroom. 24 The Court held that
Sheppard was denied a fair trial and instructed the district court to issue a writ
of habeas corpus.
In addition, the Court found that the trial judge made no attempt to
control the prejudicial news items disseminated by the prosecution and defense
lawyers.2 6 The Court stated that the "trial court might well have proscribed
extrajudicial statements by any lawyer.., which divulged prejudicial matters
....,,27According to the decision, collaboration between an attorney and
the press affects the fairness of a trial; therefore, the collaboration is subject
to regulation and is worthy of disciplinary measures. 28
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that a balance must be
struck between a defendant's right to a fair trial and the First Amendment
rights enjoyed by others. 29 A prior restraining order to prevent press
commentary will seldom be issued or upheld on appeal, despite the need to
insure a fair trial.30 In comparison, attorneys have limited rights to discuss
pending litigation with the media. 3' The Court recently discussed an

21. 384 U.S. 333, 363 (1966).
22. Id. at 338-49.
23. Id. at 353.

24. Id. at 358-59.
25. Id. at 363.
26. Id. at 361.
27. Id.

28. Id. at 363.
29. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539,551 (1976); see MODEL RULES
OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr Rule 3.6 cmt. 1 (1989).

30. Nebraska Press,427 U.S. at 570.
31. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.6; ROBERT H.
ARONSON Er AL, PROBLEMS, CASES, AND MATERIALS IN PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 631-33 (1985); cf MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-107

(1989) (unlike Rule 3.6, allows an attorney to describe physical evidence seized).
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attorney's right to make public comments prior to trial in Gentile v. State Bar
of Nevada.3" Gentile called a press conference after his client was indicted
for an alleged theft of a safety deposit vault.33 He told the press the
evidence demonstrated his client's innocence, the likely thief was a police
detective, and some victims were not credible because they were drug dealers
or convicted money launderersY The State Bar of Nevada filed a complaint
alleging that Gentile's statements violated the Nevada disciplinary rule
regarding pretrial publicity. 35 The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed the
decision to issue a private reprimand.36
The United States Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Nevada
Supreme Court and held that the rule was void for vagueness. 37 The Court
found that the rule's "safe harbor" provision seemed to permit attorneys to
make statements regarding the general nature of the claim or defense even if
such statements were likely to cause prejudice.3 8 According to the Court,
this imprecise rule could lead to discriminatory enforcement.39 The Court
noted that the possibility of discriminatory enforcement was of particular
relevance because criminal defense lawyers, who challenge the actions of the
state, are more likely to be affected by the regulation.40
Despite the reversal on vagueness grounds, five members of the Court
agreed that the speech of lawyers representing clients in pending cases may
be regulated under a less demanding standard than that required for regulation

32. 111 S. Ct. 2720 (1991).
33. Id. at 2723. The client was acquitted by a jury six months later. Id. "[T]he
trial judge had succeeded in seating an impartial jury that was unaffected by the media
coverage .... " 77 A.B.A. J. 50 (1991).
34. Gentile, 111 S. Ct. at 2729.
35. Id. at 2723. Nevada Supreme Court Rule 177 is substantially similar to
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr Rule 3.6. Id. Part (1) states that "[a]
lawyer shall not make an extrajudicial statement that a reasonable person would expect
to be disseminated by means of public communication if the lawyer knows or
reasonably should know that it Will have a substantial likelihood of materially
prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding." Id. at 2737. Part (2) lists the character of
statements that might have such an effect. Id. at 2737-38. Part (3) states that an
attorney may "state without elaboration.., the general nature of the claim or defense"
and enumerates other permissible statements. Id. at 2738.
36. Id. at 2723.
37. Id. at 2731.
38. Id. According to the court, the additional evidence that Gentile had studied
the rule before he called the press conference demonstrated that the rule "create[d] a
trap for the wary as well as the unwary." Id. at 2731-32.
39. Id. at 2732.
40. Id.
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of the press. 41 The Court noted that a group of preceding cases did not
permit suppression of speech unless the speech would cause a "clear and
present danger" to an adjudicative proceeding. 42 For example, a court may
not suppress press commentary on a trial unless the state can show that the
unchecked publicity would render it impossible to find impartial jurors.43
Although the media benefits from this high level of protection, the Court
found that an attorney's First Amendment rights are adequately protected by
a rule that proscribes statements that may have a "substantial likelihood of
material prejudice" to pending litigation. 44 The Court stated that the right to
a fair trial is a fundamental one that must be protected by "narrow and
necessary" limitations on lawyers' speech.45
The Court observed that attorneys, as participants in the judicial system,
may expect more strict regulations in many areas that involve First Amendment issues. 46 Because lawyers have special access to information that may
lead the public to believe that their extrajudicial statements are authoritative,
a lawyer's statements pose an inherent threat to the fairness of a trial,
according to the Court.47 As officers of the courts, attorneys may not burden
the judicial system by making statements that can affect the outcome of the
trial or prejudice the jury venire.48 Therefore, the "substantial likelihood"
test is a constitutionally permissible balance between the lawyer's First
Amendment rights and the right to a fair trial.49
B. Solicitation
The United States Supreme Court upheld a professional rule that
proscribed an attorney's ability to solicit business in Ohralikv. Ohio State Bar
Ass'n.50 The Court held that a state bar association may discipline a lawyer
for soliciting clients in person, for pecuniary gain, under circumstances likely

41. Id. at 2744.
42. Id. at 2742-43; see Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976);
Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331 (1946); Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252

(1941).
43. See Nebraska Press,427 U.S. at 569 (1976).
44. Gentile, 111 S. Ct. at 2745.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 2744; see, e.g., Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978);
Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977); Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333
(1966).
47. Gentile, 111 S. Ct. at 2745.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
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to pose dangers that the state has an interest in preventing.51 Such dangers
include assertion of fraudulent claims and potential harm to the client through
overreaching, overcharging, under-representation, and misrepresentation. 2
Ohralik was disciplined for soliciting the legal business of two young
in
automobile accident victims. 53 He visited the driver while she was still 54
the hospital and visited the passenger at her home, without prior invitations.
Ohralik sued the accident victims for breach of contract when they subsequently discharged him; they filed complaints against him with the local bar
association.5 5 Although Ohralik claimed the solicitation was protected by the
First Amendment, 56 the Court found that the state's disciplinary rule could
be constitutionally applied to suspend him for an indefinite time period. 7
The Court noted that commercial speech generally gets limited protection
and may be subject to more regulation than other types of speech. 58 The
Court observed that in-person solicitation may not lead to the desirable goals
of informed and reliable decision-making because it has a tendency to exert
pressure on the client to make a quick decision.5 9 The state interests in
protecting consumers and maintaining professional standards are strong;60
therefore, the attorney may be disciplined whether or not harm actually
resulted from the solicitation.61
Ohralik can be distinguished from solicitation cases where the attorney
has not contacted a potential client for the purpose of pecuniary gain. 62 In
NAACP v. Button,63 the Supreme Court held that the activities of the NAACP
and its legal staff were modes of expression and association protected by the
First and Fourteenth Amendments, which Virginia could not prohibit under its
power to regulate the legal profession.6
The legal staff of the NAACP held several meetings with parents and
children to explain the legal steps necessary to achieve desegregation in their

51. Id. at 461, 468.
52. Id. at 461.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

449-50.
450-51.
452.
455.
453-54, 467.
456.
457-58.
460.

61. Id. at 464.
62. In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
63. 371 U.S. 415.
64. Button, 371 U.S. at 428-29.
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school districts.65 The staff brought forms to the meetings to obtain
signatures of prospective litigants.6 The Supreme Court of Virginia held
that a state statute and the Canon of Ethics prohibited this activity because it
was a form of solicitation. 67
The United States Supreme Court held that a state "may not, under the6
guise of prohibiting professional misconduct, ignore constitutional rights."1
In this case, the NAACP legal staff was engaged in "solicitation" for the
public interest, not for private gain. 69 Therefore, Virginia's compelling
interest in regulating the illegal practices of barratry, champerty, and
maintenance 7 did not apply to the activities in question.7'
In In re Primus,72 the United States Supreme Court held that an attorney
who seeks to pursue litigation as a form of political expression cannot be
disciplined unless the state shows that the conduct actually caused undue
influence or other harm.7' Primus received a public reprimand74 because
she sent a letter to a potential client describing the legal services offered by
the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU).75 The letter suggested that the
potential client could seek legal recourse for an allegedly unconstitutional
sterilization. 76 The Court held that Primus' activity on behalf of the ACLU
was protected by the First Amendment because it was a form of political
expression, not an attempt to solicit a pecuniary benefit. 77 Attorneys have

65. Id. at 421.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Id.
Id. at 424-26.
Id. at 439.
Id. at 440, 444.

70. Barratry is defined as "the offense of frequently exciting and stirring up
quarrels and suits, either at law or otherwise." BLACKS LAw DICTIONARY 137 (5th ed.
1979). Champerty is "a bargain by a stranger with a party to a suit, by which such
third person undertakes to carry on the litigation at his own cost and risk, in
consideration of receiving, if successful, a part of the proceeds or subject sought to be
recovered." Id. at 209. Maintenance is defined as "an officious intermeddling in a suit
which in no way belongs to one.. . ." Id. at 860.
71. Button, 371 U.S. at 439.
72. 436 U.S. 412 (1978).
73. Id. at 434.
74. Id. at 421.
75. Id. at 416.

76. Id. Primus wrote the letter after she met the potential client at a gathering to
discuss the sterilization practices of South Carolina doctors. Id. at 415. According to
news reports, welfare mothers in Aiken County, South Carolina were sterilized as a
condition of the continued receipt of medical assistance under the Medicaid program.
Id.

77. Id. at 428. The Court observed that the ACLU does not use litigation to
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a fundamental right to engage in "collective activity undertaken to obtain
meaningful access to the courts," as distinguished from the right to solicit
clients for purely personal gain.7
Primus was disciplined by the South Carolina Supreme Court because her
letter could have led to a lawsuit and a possible financial benefit to the
ACLU.7 9 The United States Supreme Court stated that the level of constitutional scrutiny would not be lowered because of a possible monetary gain for
the ACLU in the form of court-ordered attorney fees.8° The opinion
distinguished counsel fees awarded by a court from traditional fee-paying
arrangements8 ' and found that the ACLU sponsored litigation to vindicate
civil rights, not to make money.8" Primus' letter represented part of the
organization's political expression; therefore, she could not be disciplined
unless the state showed undue influence, overreaching, misrepresentation, or
invasion of privacy actually occurred. 3 While the state may impose
reasonable restrictions on the time, place, and manner of solicitation by
lawyers, it must regulate with greater precision in the context of political
expression and association. 84
C. Advertising
The American Bar Association's Code of ProfessionalResponsibility of

1969 (the Code) and its predecessor, the Canon of Ethics, restricted virtually
all attorney advertising. Lawyers could only disseminate a limited amount
of information to the public, such as addresses, phone numbers, educational
degrees, and areas of practice.86 The ABA modified the Code in 1976 to
allow advertisements in the yellow pages of telephone directories.87 The

merely resolve private disputes; litigation is a form of political expression for the
group. Id.
78. Id. at 426 (citing United Transp. Union v. Michigan Bar, 401 U.S. 576, 585
(1971)); cf. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
79. Primus, 436 U.S. at 428.
80. Id.

81. Id. at 429.
82. Id. at 430.
83. Id. at 434-35.

84. Id. at 437-38.
85. Justice DepartmentDismissesAntitrust Suit Against American Bar Associa-

tion, 64 A.B.A. J. 1538, 1539 (1978).
86. Id. at 1539.
87. Code Amendments Broaden InformationLawyers May Provide in Law Lists,
Directoriesand Yellow Pages, 62 A.B.A. J. 309 (1976).
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majority of states followed rules that were substantially equivalent to the ABA
Code."'
Bates v. State Bar of Arizona89 altered the ability of states to regulate
lawyer advertising". The attorneys who were disciplined in Bates advertised
in a local newspaper that they offered "legal services at very reasonable fees"
and listed fees for some services. 91 This conduct violated an Arizona
disciplinary rule that prohibited attorneys from advertising in the newspaper.9'
The United States Supreme Court recognized that solicitation and
advertising by attorneys are subject to state regulation and rejected the
appellants' claim that the restraint was a limitation on competition in violation
of the Sherman Act.93 The Court noted, however, that commercial speech
is entitled to some protection because it may foster informed and reliable
decision-making.94 The Court noted the traditional justifications for such
restrictions pointed to advertising's adverse effects on professionalism and the
administration of justice, as well as the inherently misleading nature of such
ads. 95 They found these reasons were not substantial enough to warrant
complete restriction of attorney advertising.9 6 The Court stated that "[s]ince
the belief that lawyers are somehow 'above' trade has become an anachro97
nism, the historical foundation for the advertising restraint has crumbled."
The Bates opinion recognized that misstatements in advertising may be
more strictly regulated because the public lacks sophistication regarding legal
services. 9' For instance, claims relating to the quality of legal services may
be misleading to the public. 99 Reasonable restrictions on the time, place and
manner of advertising are permissible, but a state cannot restrict a truthful

88. See supra, note 85, at 1538, 1540.
89. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
90. Id. at 384.
91. Id. at 354.
92. Id. at 355. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-101(B)
(1976), incorporated in Rule 29(a) of the Supreme Court of Arizona, did not permit
lawyers to use newspaper, magazine, radio or television advertisements. Id. It also
prohibited display ads in city or telephone directories. Id.
93. Id. at 362-63.
94. Id. at 364.
95. Id. at 368-79.

96. Id. at 379.
97. Id. at 371-72.
98. Id. at 383.
99. Id. at 366.
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advertisement
concerning the availability and terms of routine legal servic0
es.

10

The Court reaffirmed the Bates decision in In re R.MJ. 0°' and held that
Missouri's rule regulating the content of attorney advertising was unconstitutional because it placed an absolute prohibition on some types of potentially
misleading information,
even though the information could be presented in a
10 2
non-deceptive manner.
Missouri's disciplinary rule was revised after the Bates decision to permit
attorneys to advertise in newspapers and telephone directories.0 3 An
addendum to the revised rule limited the descriptions an attorney could use for
areas of practice and required a disclaimer of certification of expertise for the
specific listings.' In In re R.M.L, the attorney was disciplined because he
placed ads in the local telephone directories and newspapers listing areas of
practice such as "personal injury" and "real estate" instead of "tort law" and
"property law" as required by Missouri's rule.'05 The attorney also listed
some areas of practice that were not permitted by the rule and failed to
include the disclaimer of certification of expertise required by the rule. The
attorney further stated in his ads that he was "admitted to practice before the
United States Supreme Court," a claim that, while true, was challenged as
misleading.' 6 He was
charged with unprofessional conduct and received
07
a private reprimand.
The United States Supreme Court noted that even when a communication
is not misleading, the state has some authority to regulate it.0 8 The
regulation, however, must be in proportion to the substantial state interest

100. Id. at 384. Justice Rehnquist in his dissent said that such an expression,
even if truthful, was not protected by the First Amendment. Id. at 404 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
101. 455 U.S. 191 (1982).
102. Id. at 203-07.
103. Id., at 193. Missouri Supreme Court Rule 4, DR 2-101 stated that a lawyer
could publish ten categories of information: name, address and telephone number;

areas of practice; date and place of birth; schools attended; foreign language ability;
office hours; fee for an initial consultation; availability of a schedule of fees; credit
arrangements; and the fixed fee to be charged for certain specified "routine" legal
services. Id. at 194. An addendum to the rule provided that if the lawyer chose to list
areas of practice, those areas had to be generally described as civil and/or criminal
practice, or taken from a list of 23 specific descriptions. Id. at 194-95 (citing Rule 4,
Addendum III (adv. comm. Nov. 3, 1977)).
104.
105.
106.
107.

Id. at 195; see also supra note 99.
Id. at 197.
Id.
Id. at 197-98.

108. Id. at 203.
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being furthered."° The Court observed that the use of terms such as
"personal injury" and "real estate" rather than "tort law" and "property law"
would not mislead the public."0 Furthermore, the use of specific listings
such as "contracts" and "securities" that were not included in the rule's list
were not inherently deceptive. Therefore, the Court held that the rule was an
invalid restriction upon speech.'
The attorney was also charged with a violation because he mailed
announcement cards to persons other than "lawyers, clients, former clients,
personal friends and relatives.""12 The Court found that it was not clear that
such an absolute prohibition was necessary to properly supervise attorney
advertising."' The Court suggested that states might regulate mailings by
requiring attorneys to file a copy of them with the state bar advisory
committee.14
The opinion allows the states to retain authority to regulate advertising
that is inherently misleading or that has proved to be so in practice, but the
First and Fourteenth Amendments require that the regulations be no more
extensive than is reasonably necessary to further a substantial government
interest." 5
D. Criticism of the Judiciary
Attorneys have always maintained the right to respectfully criticize the
acts of courts and judges, 116 but they have been disciplined for using
improper outlets to question the judiciary." 7
In 1871, the United States
Supreme Court first observed that an attorney's speech is subject to restric-

109. Id.
110. Id. at 205. The Court noted that the portion of the advertisement that stated
"admitted to practice before the United States Supreme Court" could be misleading,
but the Missouri Supreme Court made no such finding. Id.
111. Id. at 205.

112. Id. at 206.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 207.
116. See William E. Shipley, Annotation, Attorney's Criticism ofjudicialActsas
Ground of DisciplinaryAction, 12 A.L.R.3d 1408, 1411 (1967); see also Bridges v.

California, 314 U.S. 252, 270-71 (1941) (stating that "an enforced silence ... would
probably engender resentment, suspicion, and contempt much more than it would
enhance respect" for the judiciary).
117. Shipley, supra note 116, at 1418-33; see also In re Whiteside, 386 F.2d 805,
806 n.4 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 920 (1968); Louisiana State Bar Ass'n
v. Karst, 428 So. 2d 406, 410 (La. 1983); In re Lacey, 283 N.W.2d 250, 252 (S.D.

1979).
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tions in Bradley v. Fisher. Bradley brought a civil action against Judge
Fisher after Fisher ordered Bradley's name struck from the criminal court of
the District of Columbia.' 9 Judge Fisher entered the order after Bradley
allegedly threatened him during a trial for the murder of Abraham Lincoln. 20 The Supreme Court held that Bradley was not entitled to damages
and that the criminal court had the power to strike his name from its rolls of
practicing attorneys.'
The Court stated that attorneys have an obligation
to "maintain at all times the respect due to courts of justice and judicial
officers."" 2

After the Bradley decision, some states developed rules of legal
ethics.123 In 1908 the American Bar Association promulgated the Canons
of Professional Ethics. 24 The Canons required attorneys to maintain respect
for the courts, not to provide protection for individual judges, but to maintain
the "supreme importance" of the courts in general.' 2 Interpretations of the
Canons tended to prohibit entirely criticism of the judicial system without
weighing its actual effect on the administration of justice." z
The United States Supreme Court once again addressed the issue of an
attorney's right to criticize the judiciary in In re Sawyer. 27 Sawyer was one
2
of the defense counsel for several people indicted under the Smith Act.' 1
She gave a speech six weeks after the trial began, stating that "rather shocking
and horrible things ...

go on at the trial." 29

Sawyer also said that

118. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1871).
119. Id. at 337-38.
120. Id. at 344. Bradley defended John Suratt, who was accused of assassinating

Lincoln. Id.
121. Id. at 346-54.

122. Id. at 355. The Court said that this obligation included "abstaining out of
court from all insulting language and offensive conduct toward the judges personally
for their judicial acts." Id.
123. Jeanne D. Dodd, Comment, The FirstAmendment and Attorney Discipline
for Criticism of the Judiciary: Let the Lawyer Beware, 15 N. KY. L. REV. 129, 134

(1988).
124. Id.; see also Note, Attorney Disciplineand the FirstAmendment, 49 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 922, 924 (1974).
125. CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHics No. 1 (1908); see, e.g., Shipley, supra

note 116, at 1410 (1967).
126. Dodd, supra note 122, at 134.
127. 360 U.S. 622 (1959).

128. Id. at 623. The Smith Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (1988) criminalizes the
advocacy of overthrowing the government by force or violence, or assassination of a
public officer. The Act also makes it a crime to organize a group to achieve these
ends.
129. Id. at 628.
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"[tihere's no such thing as a fair trial in a Smith Act case. All rules of
evidence have to be scrapped or the Government can't make a case."'30 The
Court held that Sawyer could not be disciplined for making these statements
because they only reflected general criticism of the state of the law and Smith
Act trials.13' The Court noted, however, that its holding was based on a
narrow question: whether Sawyer's speech impugned the integrity of Judge
Wiig, who presided over the trial.13' The Court found that even if Sawyer's
statements implied that Judge Wiig was erroneously interpreting the law,
"attribution of honest error to the judiciary is not cause for professional
discipline in this country.' 3 The Court reasoned that appellate courts and
law reviews often say that judges take an erroneous view of the law without
"imput[ing] ...disgrace.' 34 The opinion
noted that Sawyer did not directly
35
criticize the competence of Judge Wiig.1
In a concurring opinion, Justice Stewart stated that attorneys may be held
to higher standards than the average citizen, reasoning that "[o]bedience to
ethical precepts may require abstention from what in other circumstances
might be constitutionally protected speech." 36 Stewart said that if the
principal opinion suggested an attorney might invoke the First Amendment to
avoid discipline for proven unethical conduct, he would not support such an
intimation. 37
In the dissent, Justice Frankfurter disagreed with the plurality's "narrow"
holding and said that the issue was whether Sawyer interfered with the
administration of justice by making the speech during a pending trial. 3 He
stated that the issue could not be resolved by conducting a free speech
analysis. 3 9 According to Frankfurter, Sawyer's statements directly attacked
the integrity of the courts and impliedly questioned the integrity of the
judge. 40 Therefore, he agreed with the imposition of a one-year suspension.' 4 '

Although the Court recognized some First Amendment protection for
attorneys in Sawyer, lower courts have often refused to apply it in disciplinary

130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

629.
633.
626.
635.

646-47 (Stewart, J., concurring).
646.
652 (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting).
666.
669.
669.
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actions.' 42 The American Bar Association adopted a new set of standards
in 1970 to "strike a better balance" between the obligation of an attorney to
maintain respect for the courts and the right to free speech. 43 States,
however, have struck this balance employing widely divergent standards in
disciplinary proceedings.'"
To date, the United States Supreme Court has not provided a clear test
to balance an attorney's First Amendment right to criticize the judiciary with
a state's right to enforce professional standards.' 45
IV. THE INSTANT DECISION
Although Westfall claimed that his comments were directed at the court
of appeals' opinion, and not at Judge Karohl personally, the court found no
merit in this claim. 46 The court likewise rejected Westfall's argument that
his statements were merely an opinion and could not be false. 47 The court
found that Westfall's statements clearly implied an objective fact: that Judge
Karohl demonstrated dishonesty and a lack of judicial integrity when he
granted the writ of prohibition. 48 The court refused to "microscopically
examine" each sentence and rejected Westfall's claim that he merely meant
'
the opinion was "intellectually dishonest."149

142. Dodd, supra note 123, at 138.
143. Id.
144. Sandra M. Molley, Note, RestrictionsonAttorney Criticism of the Judiciary:
A Denial of First Amendment Rights, 56 NoTRE DAME LAW 489, 495-99 (1981).
Some courts restrict all potentially harmful comments, whereas others impose
discipline only when statements cause harm. Id. at 495-96. The courts have two bases
for restricting an attorney's speech: (1) the attorney has voluntarily submitted to
curtailment of speech by voluntary admission to the bar, or (2) the need to maintain
public confidence in the legal system prevents the attorney from seeking the shield of
the First Amendment. Id. at 496.
145. Molley, supra note 144, at 504; see also In re Westfall, 808 S.W.2d 829,
833 (Mo.) (en banc), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 648 (1991); Henry J. Reske, Limited Free
Speech for Lawyers, 77 A.B.A. J.22, 23 (Oct. 1991).
146. Westfall, 808 S.W.2d at 832. For a summary of Westfall's statements,, see
supra note 6.
147. Id. at 832-33. The court relied on Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 110 S.
Ct. 2695, 2705-06 (1990), where the Supreme Court refused to recognize an "artificial
dichotomy" between opinion and fact. The Supreme Court found that even statements
phrased in terms of an opinion could imply objective facts and constitute an action for
defamation. Id. at 2706.
148. Westfall, 808 S.W.2d at 833.
149. Id. at 832-33.
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After rejecting Westfall's interpretations of the television interview, the
court conducted a First Amendment analysis. 50 The court first noted that
no rigid rules govern the standards to be used when balancing state interests
5
in the administration of justice with a lawyer's First Amendment rights.' '
It is clear that attorneys receive the full protection of the First and Fourteenth
Amendments when they are parties to civil or criminal cases, 52 but their
constitutional protection in a disciplinary proceeding has no clear standard. 5 3
The opinion outlined three different approaches to determining an
attorney's constitutional rights in a disciplinary proceeding. 5 4 Some courts
completely reject First Amendment claims in disciplinary proceedings.' 55
Another group of opinions holds that attorneys waive their right to criticize
the judiciary upon their voluntary entrance to the bar. 5 6 Other cases give
an attorney the full protection of the First Amendment in a disciplinary
action. 5 7 Finally, the Missouri Supreme Court noted that the United States
Supreme Court has not specifically addressed this issue, but it found only
peripheral guidance in some cases." 8
The United States Supreme Court cases "make [it] clear that speech
concerning public officials, including judges, may be protected speech,"'I 9
but the Missouri Supreme Court tempered this comment by stating that
"[e]ven protected speech may be regulated.1i 6 The regulation may only be
imposed to further an important governmental interest, and this determination
requires a balancing test. 16' The Missouri Supreme Court in Westfall found
a substantial state interest in maintaining public confidence in the administration of justice, including public confidence in the appellate process.' 62 This

150. Id. at 833.
151. Id.
152. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74 (1964).
153. Westfall, 808 S.W.2d at 833.
154. Id. at 833-34.
155. Id.; see, e.g., In re Raggio, 487 P.2d 499, 500 (Nev. 1971).
156. Westfall, 808 S.W.2d at 834.
157. Id.; e.g., In re Hinds, 449 A.2d 483, 489 (N.J. 1982).
158. Westfall, 808 S.W.2d at* 834. The court outlined the history of the First
Amendment's role in disciplinary proceedings. See id. at 834-36. For a discussion of
this history, see supra notes 21-145 and accompanying text.
159. Westfall, 808 S.W.2d at 835.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 835-36.
162. Id. at 836; see Middlesex Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S.
423, 434 (1982) (the judiciary and the public depend upon a state to enforce high
standards of professional conduct).
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interest must be balanced against an attorney's right to free expression, as
contrasted with a layperson's right to free speech.'63 The court stated that
attorneys must adhere to rules of professional responsibility to ensure the
confidence of litigants and the public."
If an attorney questions the
integrity or qualifications of a judge, knowing the statements are false, or with
reckless disregard as to their truth or falsity, the administration of justice may
6
suffer.
The Westfall court also noted that the government interest in administration of justice through a fair and impartial judiciary may be furthered by
criticism of the judicial process.'6 Criticism unsupported by facts, however,
does not further this state interest. 67
In construing Rule 8.2(a), the court found that the standard used in a
defamation proceeding was not necessary in a disciplinary action, and defined
the meaning of "reckless disregard" in the disciplinary context." According
to the court, a subjective standard of "reckless disregard" did not properly
redress a public wrong such as interference with the administration of
justice.' 69 The court used the reasoning in In re DisciplinaryAction Against
Graham,'7" which differentiated a defamation action, a personal wrong with
a personal redress, from professional discipline, correction of a public
wrong.' 7' The purpose of professional discipline is not to punish the
offender but to protect the public. 72 The state interest in the administration
of justice is compelling and therefore, an analysis of an attorney's statements
using an objective standard would survive a constitutional challenge.' 73
The court, applying this standard, held that Westfall violated Rule 8.2(a)
of Missouri's Rules of Professional Conduct.1 74 The court characterized
Westfall's statements as implying a "deliberate, dishonest, conscious design

163. Westfall, 808 S.W.2d at 836; see also In re Frerichs, 238 N.W.2d 764, 769
(Iowa 1976) ("A lawyer acting in a professional capacity, may have some fewer rights
of free speech than would a private citizen."). But cf In re Hinds, 449 A.2d 483, 489
(N.J. 1982) (attorneys are entitled to the First Amendment protection every citizen
enjoys even when they participate in the administration of justice).
164. Westfall, 808 S.W.2d at 836.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Oklahoma Bar Ass'n v. Porter, 766 P.2d 958, 969 (Okla. 1988).
168. Westfall, 808 S.W.2d at 836-37.
169. Id. at 837.
170. 453 N.W.2d 313 (Minn. 1990).
171. Westfall, 808 S.W.2d at 837 (citing Graham, 453 N.W.2d at 322).
172. Id. at 836.
173. Id. at 837.
174. Id. at 838.
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on the part of the judge to serve his own interests."' 75 The court noted that
Westfall made the statements about the opinion and Judge Karohl without first
investigating if Judge Karohl had (1) written previous opinions about the
armed criminal action statute, (2) participated in any cases involving it, or (3)
expressed any personal opinions about it.176 This lack of investigation
demonstrated Westfall's reckless disregard for the truth or falsity of his
177
statement that the judge "made up his mind before he wrote the decision."
The court reasoned that Westfall's statements were false and without
basis because Judge Karohl's opinion followed precedent. 78 The court
observed that Westfall did not accuse the judge of criminal acts or engage in
other forms of blatant misconduct.179 The court noted, however, some
aggravating circumstances, such as Westfall's failure to make a public apology
and the timing of the statements while an appeal was still pending.18 After
balancing these factors and noting that this case addressed a matter of first
impression, the court found that a public reprimand was appropriate.'
Judge Seiler, although agreeing with the result, stated that it was not
"necessary or desirable" to determine what constitutional standard should be
applied to an attorney in a disciplinary action. 82 He found that Westfall's
conduct was a violation of Rule 8.2(a) under any test.'83
V. THE DISSENTING OPINION
Chief Judge Blackmar'8 characterized Westfall's statements as the
epitome of political expression. s5 Judge Blackmar took Brennan's approach

175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id. The court noted that the court of appeals opinion relied on Missouri v.
Hunter, 459 U.S. 359 (1983). In that case the Supreme Court held that cumulative
sentences imposed in a single trial for robbery and armed criminal action did not
constitute double jeopardy because the intent of the Missouri legislature to authorize
cumulative punishments under two statutes was clear. Id. at 368-69. Bulloch applied
for the writ of prohibition when he was prosecuted in a second proceeding, however,
and the Missouri courts held that a second trial for armed criminal action would
constitute double jeopardy. See Westfall, 808 S.W.2d at 839; see also Hunter, 459
U.S. at 369 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
179. Westfall, 808 S.W.2d at 838.
180. Id. at 838-39.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 839 (Seiler, J., concurring).
183. Id.
184. The current Chief Judge of the Missouri Supreme Court is Judge Robertson.
185. Id. at 839-40 (Blackmar, C.J., dissenting).
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in In re Sawyerss and analyzed the actual effect of Westfall's comments,
rather than their potential for harm." 7
Judge Blackmar stated that Westfall was sharing his view of a course of
decisions regarding a particular area of criminal law, which should not require
detailed legal research beforehand. 18s Judge Blackmar thus disagreed
with the majority's interpretation of Westfall's statements, finding that he did
not impugn the integrity of Judge Karohl.18 9 Nor did he find that the
statements were easily described as implying objective facts.' 90
Rule 8.2(a) requires that a statement be made with a purpose to cause
harm through defamation.' 9 ' Judge Blackmar interpreted Westfall's statements as a criticism of the court of appeals opinion, without any intent to
injure the judge's reputation. 92 He found that the statements, while
"intemperate" and "disrespectful,"' 93 were merely negligent, not reckless."'

186. 360 U.S. 622, 636 (1959) (Remarks made after the course of the trial would
not tend to "obstruct the administration of justice."); see also Molley, supra note 144,
at 493.
187. Westfall, 808 S.W.2d at 840 (Blackmar, C.J., dissenting). Judge Blackmar
stated that the record did not support a finding that Westfall was trying to put public
pressure on Judge Karohl or other members of the court of appeals to grant a
rehearing. Id. He noted that "[m]otions for rehearing are usually formalities, often
sought but seldom successful." Id.; see also Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 254
(1941) (a layperson who criticizes a case while a rehearing is pending may by
experience know that a right to ask for a rehearing is illusory).
188. Westfall, 808 S.W.2d at 840 (Blackmar, C.J., dissenting). The course of
decisions Judge Blackmar refers to are discussed in Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359,
365-68 (1983). The Supreme Court outlined Missouri's interpretation of the armed
criminal action statute and held that its use for cumulative punishments was
constitutionally permissible. Id. at 368-69.
189. Westfall, 808 S.W.2d at 841 (Blackmar, C.J., dissenting). Westfall testified
at the hearing before the advisory committee that he apologized personally to Judge
Karohl and told him that he only meant to criticize the written opinion. Id. at 840.
Judge Karohl testified that he thought Westfall's statements were a criticism of the
opinion. Id. at 841-42.
190. Id. at 842-43. He noted that Missouri has always recognized a difference
between defamatory statements of fact and those of opinion that have no basis in
objective fact. Id. at 842. Judge Blackmar emphasized that the United States Supreme
Court does not require abandonment of the fact/opinion distinction. Id. at 843 (citing
Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 110 S.Ct. 2695, 2706 (1990)).
191. Id.
192. Id. Judge Blackmar reasoned that many analyses of court opinions refer to
the author rather than the opinion. Id. at 842. He also characterized Westfall's
statement that Judge Karohl "made up his mind before he wrote the decision" as a
"realistic analysis of the decisional process." Id.
193. Id. at 844.
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The dissent distinguished Westfall's statements from those contained in the
cases the majority opinion cited, where attorneys charged judges with fraud
or other illegal conduct. 95
19 6
Judge Blackmar also rejected the court's First Amendment analysis.
He found that the principal opinion "adduce[d] scanty and obsolescent
authority for the proposition that the First Amendment does not apply to, or
has limited application to, lawyer discipline cases. 1 9 7 He found that the
Advisory Committee failed to enunciate a compelling state interest19 8 or
prove that Westfall knowingly or recklessly made false statements. 199
According to the dissent, an attorney should be able to benefit from the
New York Times standard 2°° if he or she has criticized a judge.0 1 Judge
Blackmar found the majority's reliance on In re DisciplinaryAction Against
Graham2° 2 misguided, because the Graham court was faced with an attorney
who had charged a judge with illegal conduct, based solely on his subjective
belief in the truth of the charges. 0 3

194. Id. at 843. Judge Blackmar noted that the court, as the fact finder, should
not disregard Westfall's testimony as to the intent he had when making the statements,
Id.
195. Id. at 834.
196. Id. at 845.
197. Id. To support this contention, Judge Blackmar noted a trilogy of Supreme
Court cases that refused to uphold contempt sanctions given for criticism of a judge's
conduct during a pending case. Id.; see Craig v. Hamey, 331 U.S. 367, 378 (1947)
(range of permissible comment does not depend on whether the litigation is civil or
criminal); Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 347 (1946) (freedom of discussion
should be given greater weight than the possibility of influencing a pending trial);
Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 261-63 (1941) (forbids punishment by contempt
unless the statements create a clear and present danger).
198. Westfall, 808 S.W.2d at 846 (Blackmar, C.J., dissenting).
199. Id. Judge Blackmar argued that the interpretation of "recklessness" was
"casually attributed" to Westfall's statements, since it was "apparently found in his
failure to think things through or to study the case law." Id.
200. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964). The standard
set forth requires a public official to prove "actual malice" to recover damages for
defamatory falsehoods. Id. at 279. Actual malice means that a person made
statements with knowledge of their falsity or with reckless disregard as to their truth
or falsity. Id. at 279-80.
201. Westfall, 808 S.W.2d at 846. Judge Blackmar stated that the New York
Times principle and its progeny represent good policy that should apply to attorney
disciplinary actions. Id. at 847.
202. 453 N.W.2d 313 (Minn.), cert. denied sub nom. Graham v. Wemz, 111 S.
Ct. 67 (1990).
203. Westfall, 808 S.W.2d at 845 (Blackmar, C.J., dissenting).
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Notwithstanding the reasoning of the majority opinion, Judge Blackmar
found an additional reason to refrain from issuing a public reprimand. 2" He
stated that the Advisory Committee chose to file charges of misconduct as a
type of "punishment" after Westfall refused a written admonition. 2 5 He
found that the Committee's conduct had a "strong potential for chilling
freedom of expression. '' D
VI. COMMENT

In the absence of a constitutional mandate from the United States
Supreme Court, state courts have imposed divergent standards in actions to
discipline attorneys who have criticized courts or judges. Although it may be
the duty of an attorney to expose the weaknesses of the judicial system,20 7
this apparent duty is hindered by the threat of disciplinary action for
inaccurate statements.
A disciplinary proceeding is not a civil or criminal trial. 208 Its purpose
is not to punish an attorney, but to determine one's fitness to practice law and
protect the courts and public from unfit practitioners. 2 9 Courts recognize,
however, that an attorney's constitutional rights must be considered in a
disciplinary action.210 Therefore, courts will not permit the complete
restriction of a constitutional right as a means to prohibit professional
misconduct.21
The Supreme Court recognizes that states have an interest in regulating
areas of legal practice that involve free speech, such as advertising, solicitation, and trial publicity. 212
These cases, however, narrowly construe
disciplinary rules to achieve substantial state interests when the speech is a

204. Id. at 847.
205. Id. at 847-48.
206. Id. at 848. Judge Blackmar analogized the Committee's actions to those of
prosecutorial misconduct in criminal cases. Id. The dissent feared that attorneys
would accept admonitions rather than defend themselves against potentially more
serious charges. Id.
207. See, e.g., Shipley, supra note 116, at 1411; see also MODEL RuLES OF

1989).
208. In re Moore, 453 N.E.2d 971, 973 (Ind. 1983).
209. Id.

PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (Preamble

210. In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544, 550 (1968) (attorney must receive procedural

due process which includes fair notice of the charge).
211. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 439 (1963).
212. See, e.g., Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 111 S. Ct. 2720 (1991) (trial
publicity); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978) (solicitation); Bates

v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977) (advertising).
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form of political expression.213 For example, states may prohibit in-person
solicitation for pecuniary gain, but precise regulations are required to prohibit
solicitation that involves political expression or freedom of association.214
The Supreme Court states that "broad prophylactic rules in the area of free
expression are suspect," and that "precision of regulation must be the
21 5
touchstone in an area so closely touching our most precious freedoms.
In addition, the Court holds that purely commercial speech, although entitled
to less protection, cannot be completely forbidden to an attorney.26
The history of these cases shows that ethical considerations must be
balanced with the constitutional rights of the individual, even though the
purpose of professional discipline is to protect the public. The cases also
demonstrate that the public's right to know about legal processes is an
important factor in this balancing process.2 7 Criticism of the judiciary will
often involve political expression. The criticism may foster debate, improve
our judicial system, and lead to a more informed public. Such speech should
be protected by a narrow interpretation of disciplinary rules that serve to
protect the administration of justice.
The preamble to the ABA Model Rules of ProfessionalConduct invites
attorneys to improve the law and "be mindful of the deficiencies in the
administration of justice." 218 The preamble notes that an independent legal
profession is an important asset, because abuse of legal authority is more
easily challenged when lawyers are not dependent on government for the right
to practice. 1 9 When courts broadly interpret the rules of professional
conduct, however, an attorney may choose not to challenge an apparent abuse
of legal authority. The threat of loss of reputation or the right to practice may
silence the attorney who seeks to reform the law through public commentary.
The threat is made even more real when an attorney considers that a single act
may serve as a basis for discipline.220

213. See, e.g., In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 438 (1978).
214. Id. at 432.
215. Id. (citing Button, 371 U.S. at 438).
216. Bates, 433 U.S. at 379.
217. See, e.g., Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 111 S. Ct. 2720, 2742 (1991) (people
wish to be informed about the criminal justice system and may want to make changes
within it); Primus, 436 U.S. at 431 (ACLU engages in litigation as a means of
communicating useful information to the public); Bates, 433 U.S. at 364 (advertising
may carry important information).
218. MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr (Preamble 1989).
219. Id.
220. ARONSON Er AL., supra note 31, at 234-35.
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An attorney cannot make frivolous accusations and subsequently find
shelter under a First Amendment claim.2 1 Judicial decisions have made 2it
clear that disciplinary actions are proper to maintain respect for the courts~
and to prevent adverse effects on the administration of justice.2 z When
courts try to protect the administration of justice through disciplinary
measures, however, they frequently focus on the potential for harm to the
judicial system and fail to look to another important goal: public debate
should be "uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and [it] may well include
vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government
and public officials."'
When political expression is at issue, an attorney
should not be disciplined unless the state can show that the administration of
justice actually suffered because of the statements made.25 In addition, an
attorney who criticizes a court or judge should benefit from the subjective
New York Times standard; discipline should not be based on an objective
standard that restricts speech according to what a "reasonable attorney" would
say.
Clearly attorneys have a responsibility to maintain respect for the courts
and should not casually criticize judicial opinions or judges. Attorneys should
base their conduct on professional pride and fidelity to the court and
client.226 An attorney has taken an oath that a member of the press or an
ordinary citizen has not. New York Times, however, did not hold that the
press alone may benefit from the standard set forth in the case. The decision
protects everyone who chooses to criticize a public official.227 The responsibility to maintain respect for the courts may be enforced by holding an
attorney to the standards of every citizen: a statement cannot be made when
its falsity is known, or when serious doubts are actually entertained as to its
truth or falsitym An objective standard that compares an attorney's speech
to what the "reasonable" attorney would say chills an individual's freedom of

221. See In re Sawyer, 360 U.S. 622, 646 (1959) (Stewart, J.,
concurring).
222. Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 355 (1871); In re Lacey, 283
N.W.2d 250, 251-52 (S.D. 1979) (attorney who said state courts were "incompetent"
and "crooked" not justified in taking criticisms directly to the press).
223. E.g., In re Disciplinary Action Against Graham, 453 N.W.2d 313, 322
(Minn. 1990).
224. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).

225. In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 434 (1978).
226. Oklahoma State Bar Ass'n v. Porter, 766 P.2d 958, 970 (Okla. 1988).
227. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 272-273. This case specifically mentioned
criticism of judges, noting that the concern for the reputation of the courts did not
justify punishment for criminal contempt. But cf State v. Nelson, 504 P.2d 211, 215
(Kan. 1972) (New York Times is inapplicable to a disciplinary proceeding).
228. St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968).
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expression. The First Amendment "license to comment is broader than the
traditional correct demeanor expected of an officer of the court," and some
remarks that may be in "bad form" may nevertheless be protected.229 The
objective standard allows courts to interpret the rule too broadly and infringe
on constitutional rights.
The press is subject to a civil action for damages when it violates the
subjective standard; likewise, an attorney faces disciplinary proceedings and
possible disbarment. The goal of protecting the administration of justice may
be furthered by encouraging debate that is limited by the New York Times
standard.
This standard finds support in the rules promulgated by the American Bar
Association. The ABA chose to use the words of the New York Times case in
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct.230 The ABA has also stated that
"it would be an unusual case [involving criticism of a judge] which would be
held sanctionable, since as long as a statement is made in a way which
accords with the First Amendment, it would be permissible."'' 3 The legal
background of Model Rule 8.2 reveals that the drafters intended that a
subjective standard would apply to the constitutional analysis. 2 The
drafters stated that the critical factors in the analysis were the statement's
falsity and the individual's knowledge of the falsity at the time the statement
was made. 3 The drafters added that the rule does not adhere to the
previous standard, which stated that a lawyer "who criticizes judicial officials
should be certain of the merit of his complaint, use appropriate language, and
avoid petty criticisms ....
They noted that the rule was consistent with
the New York Times limitation.

229. Porter,766 P.2d at 970.
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Although recent cases have rejected this level of protection, 6 others
237
have recognized the importance of requiring this standard for attorneys.
The Supreme Court's recent observations in Gentile may indicate that the
majority would find that the objective standard applied in Westfall passes
constitutional muster. 8 Only Justices Kennedy, Marshall, Blackmun and
Stevens joined in the part of the opinion that stated, "disciplinary rules
governing the legal profession cannot punish activity protected by the First
Amendment, and that First Amendment protection survives even when the
attorney violates a disciplinary rule he swore to obey when admitted to the
practice of law."239 The majority stated that attorneys, as officers of the
courts, may expect more strict regulations in many areas that involve-First
Amendment issues.20 Therefore, the Court may well find that an attorney
who has criticized the judiciary cannot benefit from the subjective New York
Times standard that the media and other citizens enjoy.
But Gentile can be distinguished from Westfall because Gentile involved
two competing individual rights: an attorney's right to free speech and a
defendant's right to a fair trial.241 Westfall examines an attorney's right to
free speech balanced with the state's interest in the administration of
justice.242 Westfall was disciplined because his statements might affect state
interests, not because he injured the reputation of Judge Karohl. If the
purpose of discipline is to protect state interests, the attorney should benefit
from a narrow interpretation of a rule that restricts speech.
Westfall's comments reflect speech in the political forum. 243 Disciplinary Rule 8.2(a) should be construed narrowly, under a subjective standard, to
determine if Westfall made these statements knowing their falsity or with
reckless disregard as to their truth or falsity. As Judge Seiler reasoned,
Westfall's conduct may have been a cause for discipline even if a more
stringent test were applied.244 But the result of the case may be that all
attorneys will refrain from making legitimate criticism, fearing that any factual

236. See Louisiana State Bar Ass'n v. Karst, 428 So. 2d 406 (La. 1983); In re
Disciplinary Action Against Graham, 453 N.W.2d 313, 322 (Minn. 1990); In re
Holtzman, 577 N.E.2d 30, 34 (N.Y. 1991).
237. Oklahoma Bar Ass'n v. Porter, 766 P.2d 958, 967 (Okla. 1988) (attorney
called judge a racist); Ramsey v. Board of Professional Responsibility, 771 S.W.2d 116
(Tenn. 1989).
238. Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 111 S.Ct. 2720, 2744 (1991).
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242. Westfall, 808 S.W.2d at 837.
243. Id. at 840 (Blackmar, C.J., dissenting).
244. Id. at 838 (Seiler, J., concurring).
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errors they mistakenly impart will be a cause for disciplinary action.
Attorneys will be unsure of what the "reasonable" attorney would say under
the circumstances and refrain from speaking entirely. The unfortunate
consequence will be repression of speech of those who may be uniquely
qualified to enhance public debate regarding judicial officers and the courts.
VII. CONCLUSION
The statements Westfall made were negligent and disrespectful. It may
be hard to look at what Westfall actually said and understand why the
statements deserve any protection. Therefore, the most troubling aspect of the
case is not necessarily its result, but the standard used to reach that result.
The case tips the scales heavily in favor of state interests without adequate
consideration for constitutional rights. In the future, attorneys may be very
hesitant to criticize courts or judges. Respect for judges and courts is
important, but when legitimate criticism is in order, it should not be hindered
by overly restrictive professional rules of conduct.
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